

3rd June 2024

Shri Harpreet Singh Pruthi Secretary

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 3rd & 4th Floor, Chanderlok Building, 36, Janpath, New Delhi-110001

Subject: - WIPPA Comments/suggestions on Draft CERC (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024

Respected Sir,

We wish to introduce the Wind Independent Power Producers Association ("WIPPA"), a national level registered body having the association of 40 Independent Power Producers ("IPPs") of capacity around 30,000 MW with an asset base of more than Rs. 2,00,000 Crores and a healthy pipeline in the wind energy sector in India through policy advocacy and presenting independent views/ suggestions/analysis to various stakeholders at various forums to provide a fillip to the sector.

This is with reference to the CERC notification on Draft Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024 dated 30th April 2024. We are submitting our comments as **Annexure-I** for your reference.

We request CERC to kindly consider our comments/suggestions while finalizing the Draft (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024

Yours's Sincerely

For Wind Independent Power Producers Association

Parag Sharma President

Email: president@wippaindia.in

Enclosed: Annexure - 1



WIPPA Comments/suggestions on Draft CERC (Deviation Settlement Mechanism and Related Matters) Regulations, 2024

Overall comment

At the outset we want to highlight that DSM Regulations had been modified recently in Dec'22 and further modified vide order no 01/SM/2023 on 6th Feb'23. Such modifications in DSM Regulations have made the DSM bands stricter for all sources including wind and solar. This has significantly increased the DSM penalties on the already commissioned projects by more than 3 times compared with 2014 DSM Regulations (ranging between 0.6% to 1.5% of gross annual revenue). As per proposed DSM bands these penalties again expected to increase, please refer the table below for the actual impact for 3 of our large-scale wind projects:

DSM Penalties as % of Annual Revenue

Project	2014 Regulations	2022 Regulation	Feb'23 Order	Draft Regulation 2024
Wind Project -1	0.43%	6.46%	1.52%	2.51%
Wind Project -2	0.23%	2.42%	0.96%	1.63%
Wind Project -3	0.22%	1.87%	0.57%	1.26%

The changes in DSM bands has already resulted in a substantial decline in project profitability (with a decrease in IRR ~1% which is significant). New projects can include such modifications in their tariff bids, however, the existing projects where tariff is fixed such further tightening of DSM bands would further worsen their profitability. To address the issue to implement revised DSM Regulations on account of stabilization of grid infrastructure, we request following two options to provide support for existing generators, which ensure fair treatment and mitigate financial burdens on existing generators

1. The revised DSM should be applied prospectively, with a clear implementation date. This will ensure smooth transition and clarity for all existing generators.

OR

2. Recognizing the revised DSM as a "Change in Law" event and determine per unit impact on account of implementation of new Regulation. It'll allows existing generators to claim compensation for the extra financial impact incurred due to change in new deviation band rate. This involves calculating



the per unit extra cost due to the new DSM charges and establishing a transparent claim process. In such circumstance, developer may be able to install additional ESS in the project to reduce DSM penalty to support grid stability.

The only mitigation measure for fully complying with the stricter DSM framework is to improve the forecasting methodologies, which have not seen significant technological improvements in the recent past. It is also to be noted that post notification of DSM regulation 2022, a committee under the chairman, CEA has been constituted to assess the forecasting accuracy and suggest measures for improvement. The committee is still working on this aspect. It is thus emphasized that any further tightening of deviation bands for existing projects is hampering projects returns substantially as these projects have been awarded through competitive bidding and thus does not have any margin to absorb such loss of revenue. The explanatory memorandum suggests that aggregation of schedules at the ISTS pooling substation has been allowed as per the IEGC and this would result in improvement in overall deviations and resultant DSM charges payable by generators. However, no analysis of possible impact of aggregation has been provided. The benefit of such aggregation at the ISTS pooling station is not sufficient to compensate the adverse impact of the proposed change in the deviation bands.

Detailed clause-wise comments

Sr	Draft Amendment paper		Suggested change		Remarks
no.					
1.	8. Charges for Deviation		8. Charges for Deviation		
					It is noted that the proposed DSM
	(4) Charges for Deviation	, in respect of a WS Seller	(4) Charges for Deviation	, in respect of a WS Seller	bands have reduced the initial band
	being a generating station	based on wind or solar or	being a generating station	based on wind or solar or	i.e. VLws (1) from earlier:
	hybrid of wind-solar	resources, including such	hybrid of wind-solar	resources, including such	• 10% to now 5% (Solar & Hybrid)
	generating stations aggre	gated at a pooling station	generating stations aggre	egated at a regional level	• 15% to now 10% (Wind)
	through QCA shall be without any linkage to grid		pooling station through	QCA shall be without any	
	frequency, as under:		linkage to grid frequency,	as under:	Post 2014 DSM Regulations, there
					has been some improvement in
	Deviation by way of	Deviation by way of	Deviation by way of	Deviation by way of	forecasting and scheduling. And
	over injection	under injection	over injection	under injection	developers have been able to reduce
		(Payable by the Seller)		(Payable by the Seller)	forecasting errors significantly.



	Seller) (i) for VL_{WS} (1) @ contract rate; (ii) for VL_{WS} (2) @ 90% of contract rate	the $\begin{array}{c c} v) \text{ for } VL_{WS}\left(1\right) @ \\ \text{ contract rate;} \\ (vi) \text{ for } VL_{WS}\left(2\right) @ \end{array}$	(Receivable by the Seller) (i) for $VL_{WS}(1)$ @ v) for $VL_{WS}(1)$ @ contract rate;	However, most of this improvement has happened in deviation range of >20% (i.e. VLws (3) and beyond). If
	Seller) (i) for VL_{WS} (1) @ contract rate; (ii) for VL_{WS} (2) @ 90% of contract rate	v) for VL _{WS} (1) @ contract rate;	Seller) (i) for $VL_{WS}(1)$ @ v) for $VL_{WS}(1)$ @ contract rate; contract rate;	has happened in deviation range of >20% (i.e. VLws (3) and beyond). If
r ((iii) for VL _{WS} (3) @ 50% of contract rate, (iv) beyond VL _{WS} (3) Zero;	110% of contract rate; (vii) for VL _{WS} @ 150% of contract rate; (viii) beyond VL _{WS} (3) @ 200% of contract	(ii) for $VL_{WS}(2)$ @ (vi) for $VL_{WS}(2)$ @ 110% of contract rate; (iii) for $VL_{WS}(3)$ @ (vii) for $VL_{WS}(3)$ @ 150% of contract rate; (viii) for $VL_{WS}(3)$ @ 150% of contract rate; (viii) beyond $VL_{WS}(3)$ @ 200% of contract rate.	we analyze data for the existing projects, in more than 85% of time blocks error remains within ±10% for solar and hybrid, and ±15% for wind. Increasing the accuracy of forecasting within this range would require significant technological
l .	Note: Volume Limits		Note: Volume Limits for WS Seller: WS Seller Volume Limit	breakthrough on forecasting tools as well as access to highly accurate weather data.
S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S	A generating station based on solar or a hybrid of wind–solar resources or aggregation at a pooling station A generating station based on wind resource	Volume Limit $VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation up to$ $5\% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation$ beyond $5\% D_{WS}$ and up to $10\% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation$ beyond $10\% D_{WS}$ and up to $20\% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation up to$ $10\% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation$ beyond $10\% D_{WS}$ and up to	A generating station based on solar or a hybrid of wind–solar resources or aggregation at a pooling station A generating station A generating station based on wind resource $VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation up to 5% 10% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation$ $VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation beyond 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation beyond 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation up to 10% 15% D_{WS}$	It is therefore requested that till the time it is established that such technology and access to precise weather data is available, further tightening of DSM bands may not be undertaken especially for the existing projects. Calculating the DSM on a regional basis instead of at pooling stations



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggeste	d change	Remarks
no.				
	$VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation b$ 15% D_{WS} and up to 25%	·	$VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation 1$ $\frac{15\%}{DWS} 20\% D_{WS} and up$ D_{WS}	· -
2.	WS SellerVolume LimitAgenerating station based on solar or a hybrid of wind—solar resources $VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation or5% D_{WS}VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation orbeyond 5% D_{WS} and up10% D_{WS}VL_{WS}(3) = Deviation or10% D_{WS}and up to 20%$	to station solar or wind–so resource	generating based on a hybrid of olar es or tion at a $VL_{WS}(1) = Deviation$ $5\% D_{WS}$ $VL_{WS}(2) = Deviation$ beyond 5% D _{WS} and up to 20	equal to Solar Power Project, however it may possible that at aggregation level, wind has higher capacity in comparison of solar Project. It is to be noted that on an annual basis, Wind generation is higher of around 1.5 times of Solar power.



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggested change	Remarks
no.			
			exceeds solar capacity on the basis
			of 1.5 times of Solar, basing the
			DSM band solely on the solar
			project might not accurately reflect
			the potential deviations and could
			lead to an imbalance in settlement
			calculations. Instead, the DSM band
			should be based on the higher
			quantum of the installed capacity of
			wind or solar, ensuring a more
			accurate and fair approach.
			For example, consider a scenario
			where the installed wind capacity is
			150 MW and the installed solar
			capacity is 150 MW. The
			considerable of Solar & Wind for
			applicable DSM would be:
			• Solar : 150 MW
			• Wind :150 MW x 3/2 = 225
			MW
			In view of that the applicable DSM
			band should be based on the higher
			of these two values, which in this
			case is 150 MW from wind



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggested change	Remarks
no.			(considerable capacity of 225 MW against solar capacity of 150 MW). This approach ensures that the DSM band reflects the higher potential deviation source, providing a more
	8. Charges for Deviation	8. Charges for Deviation	balanced and effective settlement mechanism. It may be noted that if the
	(4) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a WS Seller	(4) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a WS Seller	mechanism for de-pooling of deviation charges is kept as per mutual agreement between
3.	(c) depooling of deviation charges for WS seller(s) connected to the pooling station shall be as per the methodology mutually agreed upon between the QCA and such individual WS seller(s).	 (c) depooling of deviation charges for WS seller(s) connected to the pooling station shall be as per the methodology approved by the Commission mutually agreed upon between the QCA and such individual WS seller(s). NLDC shall submit the methodology within 4 weeks notification of these regulations for approval of the Commission. 	individuals, it will delay the process and will result in multiple litigations in future. For streamlining the aggregation process it is important that uniform methodology should be applicable and the same should be issued by CERC or Grid-India.
4.	(j) 'Contract rate' means the tariff for sale or purchase of power, as determined under Section 62 or adopted under Section 63 or approved under Section 86(1)(b) of the Act by the Appropriate Commission or the price as discovered in the Power Exchange, as the case may be; and in the absence of a tariff or price as above, contract	(j) 'Contract rate' means the tariff for sale or purchase of power, as determined under Section 62 or adopted under Section 63 or approved under Section 86(1)(b) of the Act by the Appropriate Commission or the price as discovered in the Power Exchange, or tariff agreed	Under GEOA, substantial capacity is being planned under captive or third-party route. In these cases, tariff is not determined as per Sec 62



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggested change	Remarks
no.			
	rate shall mean the weighted average ACP of the Day Ahead Market segments of all Power Exchanges for the respective time block;	between the bilateral parties as the case may be; and in the absence of a tariff or price as above, contract rate shall mean the weighted average ACP of the Day Ahead	or 63 and is mutually agreed between the parties.
		Market segments of all Power Exchanges for the respective time block;	Such tariff should also be considered as contract rate for the purpose of computing DSM penalties. Otherwise, such projects under GEOA will be penalized with DSM charges on the basis of exchange tariffs while the similar projects u/s 62 or 62 DSM charges are computed on contract rate.
	8. Charges for Deviation	8. Charges for Deviation	Treatment of DSM on drawl should
			be as applicable to the Buyer.
5.	(5) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a Standalone Energy Storage System (ESS), shall be at par with the charges for Deviation for a general seller other than an RoR generating station or a generating station based on municipal solid waste or WS seller as specified in Clause (1) of this Regulation	(5) Charges for Deviation, in respect of a Standalone Energy Storage System (ESS), shall be at par with the charges for Deviation for a general seller other than an RoR generating station or a generating station based on municipal solid waste or WS seller as specified in Clause (1) of this Regulation. Provided that for drawl of power while charging the standalone ESS the applicable deviation charges shall be at par with Buyer.	
	8. Charges for Deviation	8. Charges for Deviation	The very purpose of co-located ESS
			with WS seller is to reduce the
		(6) Charges for Deviation, in respect of an ESS colocated with WS Seller(s) connected at the same	variability of the WS component and increase the stability of the grid.



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggested change	Remarks
no.			
6.	(6) Charges for Deviation, in respect of an ESS colocated with WS Seller(s) connected at the same interconnection point, shall be as follows:i) Such seller shall provide a separate schedule for WS	interconnection point, shall be at par with the WS seller to which it is co-located with as follows: i) Such seller shall provide a separate schedule for WS and ESS components through the Lead generator or	Now if the ESS component will be treated like a general seller it will further increase the DSM of the project making it economically less
	and ESS components through the Lead generator or QCA at the interconnection point;	QCA at the interconnection point;	viable to add this component.
	ii) Deviation corresponding to WS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for WS Seller being a generating station based on solar or hybrid of wind-solar resource in accordance with clause (4) of this regulation; and	ii) Deviation corresponding to WS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for WS Seller being a generating station based on solar or hybrid of wind-solar resource in accordance with clause (4) of this regulation; and	It will further discourage RE generators to add ESS component in a WS project for meeting the objective of minimizing the deviations.
	iii) Deviation corresponding to the ESS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for a standalone ESS in accordance with clause (5) of this regulation.	iii) Deviation corresponding to the ESS component shall be charged at the same rates as applicable for a standalone ESS in accordance with clause (5) of this regulation.	
7.	10. Schedule of Payment of charges for deviation (1) The payment of charges for deviation shall have a high priority, and the concerned regional entity shall pay the due amounts within 7 (seven) days of the issue of the statement of charges for deviation by the Regional Power Committee, failing which late payment surcharge @ 0.04% shall be payable for each day of delay.	10. Schedule of Payment of charges for deviation (1) The payment of charges for deviation shall have a high priority, and the concerned regional entity shall pay the due amounts within 7 (seven) days of the issue of the statement of charges for deviation by the Regional Power Committee, failing which late payment surcharge @ 0.04% shall be payable for each day of delay.	With past experience we have experienced that 7 days are not enough for making payments for DSM charges. And now with added validation of details to be complied by QCA the time provided for making the payment be increased to 10 days as against proposed 7 days.



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggested change	Remarks
no.			
			A significant portion of new RE projects are being planned to sell power on exchange.
8.			Further there is a difference in scheduling flexibility between selling through the exchange and via PPAs.
			 PPAs: Allow revisions of schedule 7/8 time-blocks ahead of actual delivery. Power Exchange: Does not allow revision in Day ahead schedule.
			To understand the issues, consider a scenario where an RE projects have scheduled 100 MW on the exchange under GDAM (with Day ahead schedule). On the other hand, a
			buyers have scheduled 100 MW on exchange. Now suppose RE project does not get adequate resource and generates only 80MW (i.e. actual
			injection) whereas buyers draw complete 100MW. In this case, only



Sr	Draft Amendment paper	Suggested change	Remarks
no.			
			80 MW of RE power was generated,
			whereas the buyer gets certified that
			it has purchased 100 MW of RE
			power.
			To address this issue, RE power
			should be allowed to revise the
			schedule 7/8 time-blocks ahead of
			actual delivery. In such a case
			schedule of Buyers should also be
			revised on proportionate basis.
			Keeping the same DSM bands for
			exchange sale without the flexibility
			to revise the schedule may not be
			appropriate for RE projects. This
			will restrict the development of RE
			merchant capacity in the country. In
			order to develop a robust RE
			exchange market such issue needs to
			be addressed.